

Resolution Calling for NYC Comptroller Mark Levine Review and Stay of Contested DYCD Afterschool Contract Awards

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WHEREAS, afterschool programs are essential to student safety, enrichment, and family stability, and continuity of programming is especially critical for working families who rely on consistent, high-quality providers; and

WHEREAS, The New York City Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD) runs the largest publicly funded after-school system in the country, offering over 103,000 elementary and middle school seats across all five boroughs¹; and

WHEREAS, DYCD's primary after-school initiatives are the Comprehensive After School System of New York City (COMPASS NYC) and Schools Out NYC (SONYC), which partner with hundreds of local community-based organizations², and

WHEREAS, DYCD recently undertook a re-procurement process, rebidding all of its after school contracts and announcing 806 contract awards³ at school based centers, that in many cases upended long-standing school partnerships and sparked community outcry and protest at impacted schools across New York City – including in District 3⁴⁵⁶, and

WHEREAS, DYCD allocated \$3.34 billion over a six-year term for COMPASS and SONYC Programs in the Public Schools RFP. This equates to approximately \$555 million annually⁷; and

WHEREAS, long-standing after school providers, such as Manhattan Youth, who lost contract bids at many of their existing sites, have formally requested debriefings and are appealing the DYCD's award decisions⁸; and

WHEREAS, The DYCD COMPASS re-procurement is a highly regulated city process governed strictly by the NYC Procurement Policy Board (PPB) Rules⁹, which require that the procurement

¹ <https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/after-school/compass-expansion.page>

² <https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/after-school/compass-expansion.page>

³ https://www.nyc.gov/assets/dycd/downloads/pdf/COMPASS_SB_awards_website_5.8.26.pdf

⁴ <https://www.newyorkfamily.com/manhattan-youth-nyc-after-school-loss-2026/>

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<https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/05/21/nyc-after-school-provider-contract-shakeup-sparks-parent-protest/>

⁶ <https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/services/after-school/compass-expansion.page>

⁷ <https://www.nyc.gov/site/dycd/involved/funding-and-support/contracting-view-current-rfps.page>

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<https://www.chalkbeat.org/newyork/2026/05/21/nyc-after-school-provider-contract-shakeup-sparks-parent-protest/>

⁹ <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/mocs/downloads/Regulations/PPB/PPBRules.pdf>

process must “encourage competition, prevent favoritism, and obtain the best value in the interest of the City and the taxpayers¹⁰.”

WHEREAS, The DYCD RFP process set fixed-price contracts for afterschool services, where bidders competed based on evaluation criteria other than price¹¹; and

WHEREAS, a DYCD evaluation committee scored vendor proposals based on: Organizational Experience and Capability (21 points), Service Requirements and Program Outcomes (40 points), Staffing (20 points), Community Partnership, Subcontractors and School Partnerships (8 points), DYCD Approaches (6 points), and Budget Management (5 points)¹², and

WHEREAS, the RFP specified that proposals receiving a score of 70 or above would be “considered viable and have the partnership profile moved onto the applicable NYCSPS advisor, to be reviewed and ranked, in order of preference, based on the responses given by the proposer in the partnership profile questions¹³,” and

WHEREAS, the RFP stated that “[c]ontracts will be awarded to the responsible proposers whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the City, taking into considerations factors that are set forth in this RFP, **including but not limited to NYCPS ranking**¹⁴,” and

WHEREAS, school principals were reportedly designated as NYCPS advisors but were only permitted to include one other administrator - and no families or students - preventing meaningful community engagement; and

WHEREAS, The DYCD request for proposals (RFP) process set 6-year contract terms, which are permissible under section 2-04(e) of the PPB Rules for contracts in programs where “there is a requirement for the vendor to establish linkages with other vendors in the locality,” where “the well-being of the clients would be jeopardized by potentially frequent change in the vendor,” and where “the development and continuity of a personal, supportive, or therapeutic relationship between the caregiver and the affected client(s) is an integral requirement of the support service¹⁵,” and

¹⁰ <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/mocs/downloads/Regulations/PPB/PPBRules.pdf>

¹¹ 26026P0003-COMPASS Programs in Public Schools (031855) RFP available in PassPort https://passport.cityofnewyork.us/page.aspx/en/rfp/request_browse_public

¹² 26026P0003-COMPASS Programs in Public Schools (031855) RFP available in PassPort https://passport.cityofnewyork.us/page.aspx/en/rfp/request_browse_public

¹³ 26026P0003-COMPASS Programs in Public Schools (031855) RFP available in PassPort https://passport.cityofnewyork.us/page.aspx/en/rfp/request_browse_public

¹⁴ 26026P0003-COMPASS Programs in Public Schools (031855) RFP available in PassPort https://passport.cityofnewyork.us/page.aspx/en/rfp/request_browse_public

¹⁵ <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/mocs/downloads/Regulations/PPB/PPBRules.pdf>

WHEREAS, in some cases, DYCD made contract award decisions that disrupt the continuity of long-standing personal, supportive, or therapeutic relationships; and

WHEREAS, unnecessary disruption to continuity of services may cause the exact harm that justifies the award of longer 6-year contract terms in the first place – jeopardizing the well-being of vulnerable students served by after school providers and upending long-standing vendor partnerships in the local community; and

WHEREAS, families at impacted schools had no reason to expect that a competitive bidding process was underway, and no notice was provided to families that existing contracts were being opened for bid; and

WHEREAS, parents and members of school communities were left out of the RFP process, and their input and insights into their experiences of program quality and desire for program continuity were not considered by DYCD, and

WHEREAS, stakeholder input from school principals, parents, and school communities who are directly served by DYCD after school programs should be an important factor considered by DYCD in the contract awards process and prior to award registration, particularly for the award of 6-year, multi-term contracts; and

WHEREAS, though DYCD expressly stated in the RFP that DYCD “reserves the right” to “[m]atch NYCPS with [a] viable proposer based on NYCPS rankings,” and school principals provided “DYCD with their rankings to take into consideration,” DYCD appears to have disregarded the NYCPS principal rankings in many instances – awarding contracts to vendors that school principals did not rank highly or preferred not to rank at all, and

WHEREAS, DYCD treated charter schools differently than NYCPS, releasing an addendum to the RFP on November 12, 2025 expressly favoring proposals submitted by charter schools that applied to provide after school services to their own school over outside vendor proposals - preferentially awarding contracts to charter schools over other - potentially higher-scoring vendors – so long as they received a minimum score of 70¹⁶; and

WHEREAS, City agencies are mandated to complete a formal Vendor Performance Evaluation at least once per contract year. The evaluations score vendors on three primary categories: (1) Timeliness of Performance; (2) Fiscal Administration and Accountability (3) Performance and Overall Quality. However, at least for vendors assigned contracts in District 3, DYCD does not appear to have posted Vendor Performance Evaluations on PassPort since 2018 and no evaluations are publicly available at all for some vendors¹⁷¹⁸; and

¹⁶ Addendum # 2 Re: COMPASS Programs in Public Schools Request for Proposals EPIN: 26026P00003
¹⁷<https://www.dycdconnect.nyc/Home/DownloadDocumentById?id=629a5ea78a64420bcc00212d&fileName=Performance%20Evaluation%20User%20Guide.pdf>

¹⁸ <https://a0333-passportpublic.nyc.gov/vendor.html>

WHEREAS, an audit by the NYC Comptroller of past DYCD contracts found that “DYCD did not adequately account for its decisions to contract with vendors that had experienced multiple incidents of client abuse and neglect, workplace violence involving staff, civil litigation, and/or poor performance evaluations on previous DYCD contracts. In addition, DYCD did not consistently maintain evidence demonstrating that the agency had evaluated the performance of its contractors in a timely manner and, in one case, that it had conducted a required pre-solicitation review”¹⁹; and

WHEREAS, DYCD awarded an afterschool contract at PS 145 to the YMCA despite the school’s documented dissatisfaction with the program, formal complaints to DYCD, and expressed preference not to continue the partnership – raising concerns that DYCD failed to properly consider the school’s experience and apply its evaluation criteria in a reasonable manner; and

WHEREAS, different schools experience variance in program quality even when services are provided by the same organization. For example, in District 3, even as DYCD awarded a YMCA contract to PS 145,, DYCD pulled a YMCA contract from PS 191, a Title I school located within walking distance from the West Side YMCA that has had a long-standing and positive relationship with their YMCA site director and program staff, and

WHEREAS, though the RFP process is intended to ensure “best value,” and permits consideration of a proposer’s “geographic distribution,” DYCD’s decisions do not appear to account for school proximity to unique vendor facilities. For example, PS191’s proximity to the West Side YMCA has enabled 191 elementary students to access the YMCA’s swimming pool for swimming lessons and kiln for ceramics classes for years. These are unique programming opportunities that alternative vendors are not able to provide and that schools located farther away could not practicably utilize; and

WHEREAS, Manhattan Youth is one of the most well-established after school providers for Manhattan middle schools, earning strong support from families, school leaders, and school communities due to its long-standing presence and demonstrated program quality; and

WHEREAS, Manhattan Youth founded and runs the Middle School Athletics League (MSAL), enabling thousands of students across NYC to participate in interschool athletics²⁰, and

WHEREAS, Manhattan Youth has provided afterschool programming across a wide breadth of offerings, including debate, chess, journalism, robotics, and coordination of numerous sports programs through MSAL, establishing a level of program depth and consistency that families have come to rely upon; and

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<https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/audit-report-on-the-department-of-youth-and-community-developments-awarding-of-non-competitive-and-limited-competition-contracts/>

²⁰ <https://nycmsal.org/about-us/>

WHEREAS, Manhattan Youth, in particular, seems to have been disfavored by DYCD in the RFP process, losing over half of its 24 existing after school program contracts, including at The Computer School and West End Secondary School in District 3, and

WHEREAS, contracts were instead awarded to a mix of providers such as the Imogen Foundation, the YMCA and NYJTL, some of which have limited to no experience serving middle schools and/or have very specific specialties such as tennis instruction; and

WHEREAS, In District 3, The Anderson School, Dual-Language MS, and The Computer School are co-located in the same building and have shared joint sports teams and theater performances through Manhattan Youth. However, now that DYCD has reassigned Manhattan Youth's contract with the Computer School to the YMCA, the schools will no longer be able to integrate their after school offerings under one provider; and

WHEREAS, DYCD's award decision in this instance not only failed to adequately consider the clear preferences expressed by the NYCPS advisor at The Computer School, it unnecessarily disrupts the efforts of these three school communities to integrate their after school programs so that students can access more comprehensive high quality programming than is otherwise possible when the schools are assigned to separate program providers, and

WHEREAS, DYCD's contract decision in this particular instance did not take into account the operational efficiencies and community benefits of sharing one provider among multiple small co-located schools and, therefore, did not obtain the "best value" in the interest of the City and taxpayers. This decision is inefficient and wasteful - directing taxpayer resources to duplicative efforts, administrative staff, and overhead costs and away from integrated programs and classes that directly benefit students; and

WHEREAS, many school buildings across the city contain multiple co-located schools that are often too small to independently field competitive sports teams or offer a broad range of quality afterschool programs. This example in District 3 raises broader questions about whether DYCD considered practical factors such as school co-locations in determining which proposal offered the "best value" to the City, and whether it reasonably applied its own evaluation criteria for "Organizational Experience and Capability" and "Service Requirements and Program Outcomes."; and

WHEREAS, school leaders and families were not provided with an explanation of the evaluation criteria, scoring methodology, or rationale for disregarding principal rankings, and no public information was provided regarding any appeals process that families can meaningfully participate in, leaving families without any opportunity to respond; and

WHEREAS, many incoming Fall 2026 families were informed of the robust afterschool programs historically offered by established programs during their middle school admissions diligence, and reasonably relied on the continued availability of those programs when making their ranking

decisions; and

WHEREAS, absolutely no information was provided to families regarding whether the breadth and quality of programming currently offered would be maintained by newly selected providers at the time the changes were announced; and

WHEREAS, reports indicate that participation in established sports leagues, including the New York City Middle School Athletic League (“MSAL”), may be affected, an issue that remains unresolved and reflects the uncertainty families are experiencing; and

WHEREAS, Community Education Council District 3 (“CECD3”) has received numerous correspondence from families, educators, and community members, expressing deep concern about the lack of transparency in this process; and

WHEREAS, over 6,200 people have signed a petition demanding immediate reconsideration of the contracts and restoration of the Manhattan Youth partnership²¹; and

WHEREAS, this process took place during a time of transition - beginning at the end of one mayor’s and DYCD commissioner’s term and concluding during the start of a new mayor and new DYCD commissioner’s tenure; and

WHEREAS, in Dec. 2025, the NY City Council gave DYCD a “D” rating in their agency report card, for reasons such as: a lack of transparency, a lack of communication and collaboration with providers, and needed improvements to the contracting and RFP process²²; and

WHEREAS, at the March 16, 2026 City Council Committee on Children and Youth budget oversight hearing, the DYCD Commissioner, noted that DYCD’s recent expansion to over 1,000 contracts “has increased at a pace that has strained the agency’s administrative infrastructure²³,” and

WHEREAS, the scale of the RFP process, number of contracts and vendors that required thorough vetting, lack of transparency, the exclusion of families and school leadership from the process, and the sudden displacement of long-standing providers raise serious concerns about governance, fairness, and the integrity of the procurement process;

BE IT RESOLVED, CECD3 calls upon the NYC Comptroller’s Office to stay registration of contested contract awards pending a full, independent comptroller investigation into the DYCD procurement process, including but not limited to:

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<https://www.change.org/p/save-our-afterschool-programs-demand-accountability-from-dycd-for-vendor-contracts>

²² <https://council.nyc.gov/press/2025/12/05/3016/>

²³ <https://nycetc.org/2026/04/dycd-preliminary-budget-hearing-signals-gaps-next-moves/>

- The scoring methodology and weighting of NYCPS advisor input;
- The performance data and vendor evaluations used in scoring proposals;
- The basis for preferential treatment of charter school applicants;
- Adherence to stated RFP evaluation criteria;
- Any decisions to award contracts to lower-scoring vendors;
- Rationale and documentation supporting decisions;
- Potential conflicts of interest, bias, or external influence;
- The rationale for prohibiting principals from informing or engaging families;
- The transparency of the procurement process and adequacy of public notice; and
- The sufficiency of DYCD's vendor responsibility determinations and due diligence.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that DYCD, in consultation with the NYC Public Schools ("NYCPS") and the NYC Comptroller's Office, develop clear public standards for future afterschool procurement processes, including:

- Timely notice to families, CECs, and school communities;
- Transparent publication of evaluation criteria, scoring, and provider qualifications;
- Meaningful opportunities for stakeholder input;
- Consideration of co-location efficiencies, school-specific programmatic needs, and vendor experience;
- Requirements that providers demonstrate appropriate experience for the grade levels they serve;
- Avoidance of unnecessary disruption to continuity of services;
- Appropriate weighting of vendor quality, past performance, and community satisfaction;
- Timely public posting of vendor performance evaluations;
- Robust vetting of documented complaints and responsibility determinations;
- Verification of proposal information through site visits and interviews; and
- A defined and publicly accessible appeals process.